Many media outlets are reporting that the Supreme Court ordered President Donald Trump to stop levying tariffs. However, the reality is more nuanced and does not prevent Trump from imposing tariffs altogether. The Court ruled only that he could not levy tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA); however, the president has several other options available.
The Supreme Court struck down President Trump’s emergency tariffs imposed under IEEPA, ruling that he had exceeded his authority. For his broadest actions, including the “Liberation Day” reciprocal tariffs and the “Trafficking Tariffs” on Mexico and Canada, the administration argued that because IEEPA permits the president to regulate importation during a national emergency, he could unilaterally impose tariffs.
The Court rejected that argument. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote that the power to regulate does not automatically include the power to tax, which is what a tariff is, and that if Congress intended to grant such taxing authority, the statute needed to explicitly reference tariffs or duties. Because IEEPA does not, those specific tariffs were ruled unlawful.
Within hours of the decision, President Trump invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, announcing a new global tariff initially set at 10 percent and later raised to 15 percent. That provision authorizes import surcharges of up to 15 percent to address serious balance-of-payments deficits for 150 days. The temporary authority gives the administration time to design replacement measures and signals that tariff policy will remain unsettled as congressional elections approach.
The ruling leaves unresolved whether the government must refund more than $134 billion collected under the invalidated tariffs. The Justice Department previously indicated refunds would be issued if the tariffs were struck down, but President Trump said the issue could remain tied up in court for years.
Importers who paid the duties are legally eligible to seek repayment, while downstream businesses that absorbed higher costs may pursue compensation. Some customs brokers expect importers to sell refund claims to hedge funds at a discount for immediate cash, with legal disputes and administrative backlogs slowing the process.
Tariffs have become a significant revenue source for the federal government. In January, the Treasury collected roughly $28 billion in import taxes, accounting for about 5 percent of federal revenue that month.
As rates shift, Brazilian goods previously subject to 50 percent tariffs will fall to 15 percent, and Vietnamese imports will also see reductions. Lower rates could reduce import costs in the short term and widen the trade deficit as companies accelerate shipments, while uncertainty may weigh on capital spending.
Many Americans complain about higher prices for imported goods, and Democrats are using tariffs as a midterm election issue. However, removing the tariffs would not resolve the problems they were meant to address, as the United States maintains it has valid grounds to demand changes in trade behavior and long-standing trade patterns from major partners.
Since his 2024 campaign, President Trump has promoted tariffs as part of a “Buy American” policy to return manufacturing to U.S. soil and as national-security measures, arguing that economic security is national security. That rationale has focused particularly on China, Mexico, Canada, and the European Union.
The primary goal of the China tariffs is decoupling. By imposing tariffs of 60 percent or more on Chinese goods, the administration aims to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains, punish intellectual property theft, and shrink the trade deficit. It also accuses China of failing to stop the flow of fentanyl precursor chemicals to Mexican cartels and argues that dependence on Chinese manufacturing for electronics and pharmaceuticals creates a strategic vulnerability.
The administration further contends that decades of trade deficits functioned as a wealth transfer that helped fund China’s military buildup. By restricting export income through high tariffs, it seeks to strain Beijing’s budget and force the CCP to choose between domestic spending and the PLA’s 2027 modernization goals, including hypersonic weapons and expanded naval capabilities. Tariffs are also intended to limit revenue flowing to Chinese firms producing dual-use technologies with military applications.
Regarding Mexico, the administration has designated six drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations and argues that the Mexican government has allowed safe havens for fentanyl production and human trafficking. The 25 percent tariffs are presented as a national-security measure to pressure Mexico to dismantle cartel networks and secure its side of the 2,000-mile border against what the president calls an invasion of illegal aliens.
The administration describes the cartels as a paramilitary threat and maintains that Mexico must treat drug production and trafficking as a war-level issue. President Trump has stated that if Mexico does not deploy stronger measures, including military force, the United States will use tariffs to offset the social and security costs imposed on American communities.
On Canada, the administration argues that lax visa and border policies have created a security vulnerability along the northern border. The White House claims Canada allows a backdoor entry point for Chinese nationals, terrorists, and unvetted illegal aliens who then cross into the United States. Tariffs of 10 to 25 percent on non-energy goods are described as a security surcharge intended to pressure Canada to strengthen vetting and border enforcement.
Regarding the European Union, the administration frames tariffs in terms of reciprocity. President Trump argues that the EU maintains higher barriers on American cars and agricultural products while exporting its own goods to the United States under more favorable terms, and he says tariffs are necessary to level the playing field.
He also ties the issue to NATO and industrial capacity, contending that if European allies do not pay their fair share for collective defense while maintaining trade barriers, it weakens the American industrial base. He argues that a hollowed-out manufacturing sector threatens the country’s ability to defend itself and its allies.
The Court’s ruling was narrow. It limited the use of IEEPA but did not eliminate other statutory authorities. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act permits tariffs on goods that threaten to impair national security, and the Court did not address that authority. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes tariffs in response to unfair trade practices, including intellectual property theft. Both remain legally available.
By shifting its rationale to Section 232 and other statutes, the administration is positioning these tariffs to withstand future court challenges, arguing that national security includes secure borders, resilient supply chains, and protection against adversaries that benefit from U.S. markets.
