This article originally appeared on GatewayHispanic.com and was republished with permission.
Let’s first clarify; It is not about discouraging the legitimate struggle of Venezuelans, but rather the opposite. The fight they raise is more realistic than repeating that “the demonstrations are useless, we must go through military means” and review the way they chose to seek change.
On the other side there are hundreds of thousands of soldiers, police and hitmen armed to the teeth and unarmed Venezuelans know it and suffer from it at this moment. Also, after 25 years of waiting for external military intervention, they know many of the data contained in this article.
Let’s start with the possibility of US intervention, which is the most demanded by many. Let’s understand before we start talking that we are not talking about Russia, where with a gesture Putin can order the invasion of another’s territory. Let’s go to the mechanism of use of force in the US.
In the US there is the War Powers Act of 1973, created to limit the president’s power to declare war or order military actions in undeclared wars. Its text determines the conditions for sending troops abroad in a very precise way. You can only do it under two assumptions:
The declaration of war by Congress on another state or states. The president cannot declare it himself and, therefore, Biden or his successor is tied to a decision by lawmakers.
That the country faces “a national emergency created by an attack on the United States, its territories, possessions, or its armed forces.” In the case of Venezuela that condition does not exist, at least for now. Maduro should create a reason.
Let’s go to the political situation. The US is in the electoral period. Democrats have a majority in the Senate and Republicans in the House of Representatives. They should agree after finding a reason for consensus to authorize an action in Venezuela. In the campaign it was clear that MAGA, the Republican wing, emphasized that the US must dedicate itself to protecting its borders and reducing spending on external conflicts, which led to the six-month blockade of assistance to Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel, an ally. priority and under attack.
This position, which even led to confrontation with NATO partners, makes it difficult for the United States to advance a permit to intervene in Venezuela with all the costs and political complexities that would entail getting involved in a conflict that does not directly affect a national interest.
It can be argued that one can intervene “under the desk” as was done in the past. It is not that simple either and we are going to go to history to explain it, making it clear that we can only refer to the period after 1973 when a legal limit was placed on this practice.
When Washington launched Operation “Just Cause” on December 20, 1989 and invaded Panama, it did so with authorization from Congress and invoking the risk that Noriega represented for the control of the Panama Canal, then administered by the United States.
In the case of Iran, there was an invasion of the US embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 and then the kidnapping of US citizens by Hezbollah, as well as the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 as justification.
The invasion of Grenada called “Urgent Fury” and carried out on October 25, 1983 was justified by the protection of 600 American students and 400 civilians of the same nationality present on the island as an excuse to also overthrow the pro-Soviet Hudson Austin.
The US invasion of Afghanistan that began in October 2001 was a direct consequence of the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001. There was a direct interest invoked, as in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 due to the alleged presence of weapons of massive destruction.
When the Nicaraguan Contras were supported and trained, the risk of a Soviet advance in a strategic area was invoked. In any case, Congress imposed the “Boland Amendment” in 1982 so that assistance would not be directed to overthrowing the Sandinista government. This background is valid to understand why in that same year the Ronald Reagan government decided to look for another way to finance these operations with money obtained from the drug cartels and the sale of weapons to Iran, which gave rise to the “Iran” scandal. -Cons”.
The affair ended with a prison sentence for one of the ideologues of the operation, Colonel Oliver North, and security advisor John Poindexter. In Washington they know the history and it is an additional impediment to take into account. This factor goes directly to the demand for weapons to be sent to Venezuela or guerrillas to be armed from the opposition. Neither the US nor the rest of the West can do it so easily. The CIA or the NSA have real limits; We are not inside a Tom Clancy book.
Arming and training a dissident group requires significant amounts of budget and, once again, we return to Congress, which must authorize the items and review spending to avoid the diversion of funds. Again, it is not Russia or Cuba where there is no accountability.
They also wonder why a drone or a missile is not sent to end the problem at its roots. An action of this nature falls into the same category as a military intervention with foot soldiers. This is how the system works, not how we want it to.
Chavismo was careful not to attack US interests and since January 2019 there has been no embassy or diplomatic staff due to the expulsion ordered by Maduro. North American companies in Venezuela could be an interest to protect, but until today they were not sufficient reason.
Having explained the issue of US intervention, we go to the assumption of an international intervention and this refers us to the coalition that was put together to remove Saddam Hussein’s troops from Kuwait in 1991. It is a precedent that many use as a reference.
That military operation against Iraq that brought together forces from 34 countries arose as a consequence of the authorization of the UN through Resolution 660 supported by the Security Council and the support of two of its permanent members: China and Russia.
Moscow and Beijing recognized Maduro as the winner of the elections and are allies of Chavismo. Therefore, we can rule out a UN mandate because from their place on the Security Council they can veto any attempt to repeat the 1991 experience.
The sending of a military force of Blue Helmets must be approved by the Security Council and it is impossible for China and Russia to help weaken the authority and repressive capacity of Chavismo, which in February expelled the UN High Commissioner for denouncing its atrocities.
Another armed coalition to intervene abroad was the one organized to bomb Yugoslavia in 1999, which, although unauthorized by the UN, relied on a NATO demand to intervene in a regional conflict that, in its opinion, affected its collective security.
In that case there was a political base in the European Union and a military arm that was NATO, in addition to a network of regional defense agreements that do not exist in Latin America. This brings us to the issue of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Defense, the TIAR.
The TIAR was created in September 1947 within the framework of the beginning of the Cold War at the request of the United States to ensure the support of the continent in the event of a Soviet attack. The possibilities of using it to resolve the Venezuelan crisis are slim and we will see why.
Firstly, because it is a Treaty that must be invoked in the event of external aggression against America and what happens in Venezuela is an internal matter. Denouncing the presence of Wagner’s Russians on Venezuelan soil is not enough to activate the TIAR.
Another problem is that the TIAR mechanism means that the attacked country must request its implementation and, although Maduro is not recognized as an authority, Edmundo González would not be accepted by all the members of the Treaty as legitimate president.
